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A MATTER OF LIFE AND DEATH: REVISING
THE HARMLESS ERROR STANDARD FOR
HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS
David M. Bowman
Abstract: Since 1967, federal courts have conducted harmless error analysis to determine
whether to uphold a prisoner's conviction notwithstanding a constitutional error committed
at the prisoner's trial. A review of the development of the harmless error doctrine reveals
how the U.S. Supreme Court and federal courts have solidified a rational impact test to
determine harmlessness. More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has moved away from a
clearly defined test with respect to errors alleged by habeas corpus petitioners. This
Comment analyzes the obstacles faced by habeas petitioners in establishing a magnitude of
error sufficient for reversal under the newer doctrine. It also reveals the difficulty lower
courts have in applying the newer doctrine, as illustrated by a recent Ninth Circuit decision,
Rice v. Wood. The Comment proposes a collateral-review harmless error standard that
balances a defendant's right to a fair trial with a state's interests in finality of convictions.




Consider the story ofprisoners A and B. A federal district court jury
convicts prisoner A offirst-degree murder and kidnapping. Across the
street in the county courthouse, a jury convicts prisoner B of a separate
first-degree murder and kidnapping. In both trials, the trial judge
erroneously admitted the defendant's coerced confession. Prisoner A
appeals to the circuit court of appeals, which reverses his conviction on
the ground that the constitutional error was not harmless. Prisoner A
receives a new trial that results in a hung jury. The federal prosecutor
decides not to retry him a third time. Meanwhile, after an unsuccessful
appeal to the state supreme court, prisoner B petitions for a writ of
habeas corpus to the same federal district court that convicted prisoner
A. The district court denies the writ. On review, the circuit court of
appeals finds that the constitutional error in prisoner B's trial was
harmless. The court of appeals affirms his conviction and death
sentence. Prisoner B dies by lethal injection.
In arriving at two different conclusions, the court of appeals adhered
to the U.S. Supreme Court's mandate for harmless error review with
1. Roger Traynor, The Riddle ofHarmless Error (1970).
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respect to direct appeals and collateral review. The story of prisoners A
and B demonstrates the intersection along the road of criminal justice
where federalism and finality confront an individual's constitutional
rights. At this intersection, a court offers one defendant greater
constitutional protections than, those offered to another, even when the
two defendants have been charged with indistinguishable offenses.
The U.S. Supreme Court introduced harmless constitutional error
thirty years ago in Chapman v. California.2 In Chapman, the Court held
that some constitutional errors in criminal trials are harmless so long as
the reviewing court declares beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did
not contribute to the verdict obtained.3 This standard did not distinguish
between federal prisoners appealing from convictions on direct review
and state prisoners petitioning a federal court for a writ of habeas
corpus, otherwise known as collateral review. Every defendant was
entitled to reversal of his or her conviction if a reviewing court could not
declare that the assigned error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.4
Twenty-six years later, in Brecht v. Abrahamson,5 the Court
established a new harmless error standard for prisoners petitioning for
habeas corpus. Citing the 1946 case of Kotteakos v. United States,6 the
Brecht Court held that on habeas review a court had to declare an error
harmless unless the error had a substantial and injurious effect or
influence on the jury's verdict.' Thus, Brecht established two standards
for harmless error analysis in federal courts, depending on whether the
appeal was direct or collateral. Applying the collateral appeal standard
in Rice v. Wood,' the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that receiving
the death sentence in habeas petitioner David Lewis Rice's absence was
harmless constitutional error because it had not substantially and
injuriously impacted the jury's decision to impose death.9
Part I of this Comment describes the development of the harmless
error doctrine and the emergence of two standards affecting direct and
collateral review. Part II analyzes the harmless error doctrine's
2. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
3. Id. at 24.
4. See, e.g., Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 584 (1986) (remanding habeas petitioner's case to
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals for determination of whether trial error wa; harmless beyond
reasonable doubt).
5. 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
6. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
7. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38.
8. 77 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 191 (1996).
9. Id. at 1145.
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deficiencies for habeas corpus proceedings, as illustrated by the Ninth
Circuit's 1996 decision in Rice v. Wood. Finally, Part I proposes a
clear, fair standard for assessing harmlessness, which balances the
competing interests that impact habeas corpus proceedings.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF HARMLESS CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR
A. Chapman v. California and the Birth ofiHarmless Constitutional
Error
Federal courts have applied harmless error analysis in various forms
since 1919, when Congress enacted a statute instructing trial and
appellate courts to disregard "technical" errors that did not affect
substantial rights of a party.'" Congress enacted this law amending the
Judicial Code at least in part because of popular dissatisfaction with
perceived abuses of the judicial system." In 1944, the courts adopted
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a), which instructed trial courts
to disregard errors that do not affect substantial rights of a party. 2 In
1949, Congress enacted the current harmless error statute, 28 U.S.C.
section 2111, 3 which complemented the court rule in providing
guidelines for reviewing errors in criminal trials. By removing the word
"technical" from its description of errors to be scrutinized, section 2111
broadened the type of errors reviewable. The statute continued to require
that appellate courts affirm convictions if an error did not "affect the
substantial rights of the parties."' 4 Neither section 2111 nor its
predecessors addressed whether a constitutional error could be deemed
not to affect substantial rights of a party.
In Chapman v. California,"5 the U.S. Supreme Court announced that a
conviction should be upheld if the reviewing court finds the
constitutional error so unimportant or insignificant that it may,
consistent with the Constitution, be deemed harmless.' 6 The Chapman
majority noted that constitutional violations such as denial of counsel,
10. Judicial Code § 269,40 Stat. 1181 (1919) (repealed 1944).
11. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 759 n.13.
12. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1994). The statute provides: "On the hearing of any appeal or writ of
certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without
regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." § 2111.
14. §2111.
15. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
16. Id at22.
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admission of a coerced confession, and denial of the right to an impartial
judge are so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated
as harmless. 7 In Chapman, a trial judge allowed a prosecutor to make
improper comments to the jury regarding the silence of the defendant,
who had refused to testify under the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. 8 The U.S. Supreme Court declined to adopt a rule
that all federal constitutional errors require automatic reversal.' Rather,
the Court held that the error of allowing prejudicial comments by a
prosecutor regarding a defendant's Fifth Amendment silence falls
among those errors amenable to harmless error review.20 The Court
applied a test for harmless error that it had developed in a recent
nonconstitutional error case: whether there was a reasonable possibility
that the error complained of might have contributed to the conviction.2
After a defendant has raised the error on appeal, the reviewing court
must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to
the verdict obtained.22 In Chapman's case, the U.S. Supreme Court
found the error was not harmless.2
Writing for the Court, Justice Black justified the extension of
harmless error review to constitutional errors by noting the longtime
existence of harmless error statutes and rules, adopted both by Congress
and by all fifty states, none of which on their face distinguished between
constitutional errors and errors of state law or federal statute.24 These
harmless error statutes and rules served a useful purpose by blocking
reversal for small errors or defects that had little, if any, likelihood of
having changed the result of the trial.25 As Justice Powell wrote in Rose
v. Clark,26 the harmless error doctrine recognizes that the purposes of a
criminal trial are to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt
or innocence and to promote public respect for the criminal process by
focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the
17. Id. at 23 n.8 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Payne v. Arkansas, 356
U.S. 560 (1958); Turney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)).
18. Id. at 19.
19. Id. at 21-22.
20. Id. at 24.
21. Ic (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 22.
25. Id.
26. 478 U.S. 570 (1986).
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virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error." These points were not
lost on Chapman's early commentators, who noted that the harmless
error doctrine contributed to public confidence by discouraging litigants
from abusing the trial process to obtain reversals on appeal.28
In Delaware v. Van Arsdall,29 the Court listed several factors to be
considered in determining whether an error is harmless under the
Chapman test. These factors include the overall strength of the
prosecution's case, the importance of the erroneously admitted evidence
to the prosecution's case, whether the evidence was cumulative, the
presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the
erroneous material, and, where the error involves denial of the
defendant's opportunity to impeach a witness, the extent of cross-
examination otherwise permitted.3" In Van Arsdall, the U.S. Supreme
Court remanded the case so that the Delaware Supreme Court could
apply these factors to the constitutional error of denying a defendant the
right to cross-examine a witness for bias.31
B. Expanding Harmless Error Analysis with a Threshold Test
In addition to applying the Chapman test to a variety of constitutional
errors,32 the U.S. Supreme Court has attempted to clarify whether
Chapman's list of constitutional errors that could never be held harmless
was exclusive or merely illustrative. In Rose v. Clark, the Court held that
so long as a defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial
adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other errors that may
have occurred are subject to harmless error analysis.33 The Court
27. la at 577.
28. See, e.g., Traynor, supra note I ("Reversal for error, regardless of its effect on the judgment,
encourages litigants to abuse the judicial process and bestirs the public to ridicule it.").
29. 475 U.S. 673 (1986).
30. Id. at 684.
31. IR
32. See, e.g., Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 503-04 (1987) (erroneous jury instruction
misstating element of offense); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579-80 (1986) (erroneous jury
instruction on presumption of malice); Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679-81 (failure to permit cross-
examination concerning witness bias); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 118 (1983) (per curiam)
(denial of right of presence at trial); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09 (1983)
(improper comment on defendant's Fifth Amendment refusal to testify); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S.
220, 231-32 (1977) (admission of witness identification obtained in violation of right to counsel);
Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371,377-78 (1972) (admission of confession obtained in violation
of right to counsel); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52-53 (1970) (admission of evidence
obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment).
33. Clark, 478 U.S. at 579.
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emphasized that although there are some errors that can never be held
harmless, such errors are the exception and not the rule. 4 Rather, the
Court repeated its prior statement that "the Constitution entitles a
criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one." '35 Until its decision
in Arizona v. Fulminante,36 the Court left unresolved the method by
which the circuit and district courts should identify constitutional errors
subject to automatic reversal versus those errors amenable to harmless
error review.
In Arizona v. Fulminante, the U.S. Supreme Coiurt fashioned a
threshold test for determining when to apply Chapman harmless error
analysis. The Arizona Supreme Court had reversed and remanded
defendant Fulminante's conviction and death sentence for murder on the
ground that the trial court's erroneous admission of Fulminante's
coerced confession required automatic reversal.37 Although the U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed the state court's decision," a plurality of the
Court also held that a trial court's erroneous admission of a coerced
confession should be subjected to harmless error analysis.39 Writing in
one of two majority opinions, Chief Justice Rehnquist instructed courts
to inquire whether an error was a "classic trial error" or a "structural
defect" to decide whether to apply harmless error analysis." On one
hand, if the reviewing court finds the error to be a classic -trial error, then
the court may apply harmless error analysis.4 The Court defined classic
trial errors as errors that affect a specific part of the trial nd are capable
of being quantitatively assessed. 2 In other words, classic trial error
affects only part of a trial rather than the entire framework of the
34. Id. at 577-78.
35. Id. at 579.
36. 499 U.S. 279 (1991). Fulminante was marked by an unusual split. In Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the Court, five justices found that admission of a coerced confession can
be harmless error. Id. at 310. In Justice White's opinion for the Court, a differmt grouping of five
justices held that the error was not harmless. Id. at 296. Thus, both White and Rehnquist wrote
majority opinions and dissenting opinions.
37. See State v. Fulminante, 778 P.2d 602 (Ariz. 1988), af'd, 499 U.S. 279 (1991). The Arizona
Supreme Court found initially that admission of the coerced confession was harmless error because
of the overwhelming evidence adduced at trial of Fulminante's guilt. Id. at 610-11. Upon the
defendant's motion for reconsideration, the court ruled that the U.S. Supreme Court's precedent
precluded the use of harmless error analysis in the case of a coerced confession. Id. at 627.
38. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 302.
39. Id. at 310.
40. Id. at 309-10.
41. Id. at 307-08.
42. Id.
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proceedings and occurs during presentation of the case to the jury.43 On
the other hand, if the reviewing court finds the constitutional error to be
structural in nature, then harmless error analysis is inappropriate, and the
conviction must be reversed automatically." Structural errors are errors
affecting the entire process from beginning to end, defying analysis by
harmless error standards.4" For example, the absence of counsel for a
criminal defendant or the presence on the bench of a judge who is not
impartial affect the entire conduct of a trial from beginning to end.' The
Fulminante Court concluded that a coerced confession was a classic trial
error that was harmless under harmless error analysis.47 In the end, the
Fulminante rule did not break new ground as much as it attempted to
solidify the Court's previously intuitive approach to the threshold of
harmless error analysis.4"
C. Rejecting the Chapman Harmless Error Standard for Federal
Habeas Proceedings
1. Brecht v. Abrahamson Establishes a New Standardfor
Harmlessness
In Brecht v. Abrahamson,49 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected
Chapman's standard of harmless error analysis when reviewing errors
on collateral appeal.50 From the Chapman decision in 1967 until Brecht
in 1993, it fell upon a prosecutor to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
43. Id at 310.
44. Id. at 308-09.
45. Id at 309.
46. Id. at 309-10.
47. Id at 309. In his dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens,
Justice White decried the application of harmless error analysis to admissions of coerced
confessions as overruling a "vast body of precedent without a word" and in so doing dislodging
"one of the fundamental tenets of our criminal justice system." Id at 289 (White J., dissenting).
48. David Robinson, a professor of criminal law at the George Washington University National
Law Center, stated in an interview that Fulminante "made only a rather modest change in
preexisting law." See Martin Tolchin, Defense Lawyers Assail Court Ruling on Coerced
Confessions, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1991, at B1O.
49. 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
50. Id. at 638.
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that the error complained of was harmless." In Brecht, the Court
departed from this unwavering rule. 2
Brecht involved a man convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment
for first-degree murder in a Wisconsin state court. 3 During trial, the
State made repeated references to the defendant's post-Miranda-warning
silence as suggestive of guilt.' The Wisconsin Court of Appeals set
aside the conviction on the ground that the references to Brecht's silence
violated due process and were sufficiently prejudicial to require
reversal.5 The Wisconsin Supreme Court reinstated the conviction and
death sentence, applying the Chapman standard and concluding that the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 6 A federal district court
disagreed, setting aside the conviction on habeas review.57 The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court writ,58 holding that
the proper standard of harmless error analysis on collateral review was
that set forth in Kotteakos v. United States. 9
Kotteakos stated that the proper standard of review was whether the
violation had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the
verdict.6" Although validating the harmless error statute and rule
operating at that time,6' the Kotteakos Court analyzed a factual context
distinguishable from Brecht. Defendant Kotteakos and two co-
conspirators were convicted in a federal district court of obtaining loans
under the National Housing Act by false and fraudulent statements.'
The trial court erred in allowing the government to string together for
common trial at least eight separate conspiracies to violate the National
Housing Act. 3 After the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
51. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) ("Certainly error, constitutional error, in
illegally admitting highly prejudicial evidence or comments, casts on someone other than the
person prejudiced by it a burden to show that it was harmless.").
52. 507 U.S. 619.
53. Id. at 625.
54. Id. at 624-25.
55. See State v. Brecht, 405 N.W.2d 718, 723 (Ct. App. 1987), af'd, 421 N.W.2d 96, 104-06
(Wis. 1988).
56. See Brecht, 421 N.W.2d at 104-06.
57. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 759 F. Supp. 500, 501 (W.D. Wis.), rev'd, 944 F.2d 1363 (7th
Cir. 1991), afd, 507 U.S. 619, 639 (1993).
58. See Brecht, 944 F.2d at 1375.
59. Id. (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946)).
60. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776.
61. Id. at 757-59 (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) and Judicial Code § 269 (repealed 1944)).
62. Id. at 752.
63. Id at 758.
Vcl. 72:567, 1997
Harmless Error Standard for Habeas Corpus Proceedings
convictions,' 4 the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that it
was likely that the error had a substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the verdicts." Thus, the Kotteakos standard
evolved in the context of a nonconstitutional error on direct appeal, in
contrast to Brecht's context of a constitutional error on collateral appeal.
Granting certiorari in Brecht, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the
Seventh Circuit's adoption of the Kotteakos standard for harmlessness in
habeas cases.' The Court found first that, under the Fulminante
threshold test, improper use of the defendant's silence was trial error
amenable to harmless error analysis.67 Second, the Court held that the
Kotteakos harmless error standard, rather than the Chapman standard,
applies in determining whether habeas relief must be granted for a
classic trial error.6" The Court concluded that Brecht was not entitled to
habeas relief because the improper use of his post-Miranda silence did
not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the verdict.69
In justifying the Brecht rule, the Court emphasized the necessity of
limiting federal habeas proceedings to further states' interests in finality
of convictions that have survived direct review within state court
systems.7" The writ of habeas corpus has been regarded as an
extraordinary remedy,7" granted only to "persons whom society has
grievously wronged and for whom belated liberation is little enough
compensation."72 Prisoners may petition for habeas corpus only after
exhausting the principal avenue for challenging their convictions." In
64. United States v. Lekacos, 151 F.2d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 1945), rev'd sub noma. Kotteakos, 328
U.S. 750.
65. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776.
66. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993).
67. Id. at 629.
68. Ia. at 638. In a footnote, the Court stated that its holding does not foreclose the possibility
that a deliberate and especially egregious trial error, or one that is combined with a pattern of
prosecutorial misconduct, might warrant grant of habeas relief even if it did not substantially
influence the jury's verdict. Id. at 638 n.9.
69. Id. at 639.
70. Id. at 635.
71. Id. at 633.
72. Id. at 634 (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,440-41 (1963)).
73. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1994). The statute provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted
the remedies available in the courts of the state, or there is either an absence of available State
corrective process, or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to
protect the rights of the prisoner.
§ 2254(b).
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view of the writ's limited application, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated
the policy concerns of finality and judicial economy,74 as well as public
confidence, 5 as justifying the Brecht standard for collateral review.
One policy concern is that state courts have an interest in the
"finality" of their convictions. A presumption of finality and legality
attaches to the conviction and sentence so that federal courts do not
become forums to relitigate state trials.76 This finality interest evolved
from the federalism principle that federal intrusion into state criminal
trials frustrates both a state's sovereign power to punish offenders and
its good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.7' Additionally,
state courts occupy the best vantage point to identify the effect of a
constitutional trial error.78 Recognizing this presumption of finality, the
Supreme Court has applied different standards on collateral review than
would be applied on direct review to constitutional matters.79 In Brecht,
the Court extended this different treatment of habeas petitioners to
harmless error analysis.8" Federal courts are not required to employ the
same standards for evaluating constitutional claims on collateral attack
as the standards required of state courts.8
Regarding the interests of judicial economy, increased filings in the
courts of appeals during recent decades suggest the difficulty the judicial
system has had in keeping pace with society's litigiousness.82 If nothing
else, affirmances may seem like a wise use of judicial resources where
defendants appear to be guilty despite a denial of their Sixth
Amendment rights, an admission of a coerced confession, an erroneous
jury instruction regarding an element of the crime, or some other
constitutional error. Little appears to be gained by retrial, and appellate
judges may have in mind their colleagues in the district cc.urt who do not
want their cases returned for additional proceedings. 3 Moreover, a
74. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38.
75. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946).
76. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983).
77. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 636 (citing Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 120 (1983) (per curiam)).
78. Id. at 635.
79. Id. at 634.
80. Id. at 636.
81. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363, 1371 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976)), aff'd, 507 U.S. 619, 639 (1993).
82. See Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, But Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal
Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1167, 1191 (1995) (citing statistics showing filings in
courts of appeals increased 218% from 1972 to 1992).
83. Id.
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federal judge in a habeas proceeding may feel even more uncomfortable
infringing upon a state's sovereignty over criminal matters.8"
Finally, even appointed federal judges may feel pressure from
declining public confidence in the judicial system when convictions are
reversed because of mere technicalities." A specific example of this type
of public pressure is the recent war on drugs. The nationwide problems
of drug use and trafficking and related violence have generated intense
pressure on law enforcement agencies and prosecutors to convict
defendants accused of such crimes.86 Public pressure may extend to
federal judges when they confront a defendant who clearly appears to be
guilty of a drug-related crime, yet whose trial included a significant
legal error.87 In sum, the war on drugs exemplifies the way public
confidence may have contributed to the Brecht test's expansion of
harmless error analysis.88
2. O'Neal v. McAninch Clarifies the Degree of Certainty
In Brecht, the U.S. Supreme Court instituted the "substantial and
injurious" standard but avoided defining the degree of certainty
appellate courts should have when deciding to uphold or overturn
convictions based on that standard. Under Chapman the inquiry was
separable into two questions: (1) whether there was a reasonable
possibility that a constitutional error contributed to the verdict;89 and (2)
whether a reviewing court believed this beyond a reasonable doubt.9°
Brecht provided a test only for the first of Chapman's two prongs,
replacing the contribution-to-conviction standard with a substantial-and-
injurious standard.9'
Two years after Brecht, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue
of what degree of certainty a reviewing court must possess to uphold or
overturn a conviction on the ground of constitutional error. In O'Neal v.
84. See generally Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.
85. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946) (remarking that prior to enactment
of federal harmless error statute, "[s]o great was the threat of reversal, in many jurisdictions, that
criminal trial became a game for sowing reversible error in the record, only to have repeated the
same matching of wits when a new trial had thus been obtained").
86. See Edwards, supra note 82, at 1191.
87. Id
88. Id.
89. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967) (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85,
86-87 (1963)).
90. Id. at 24.
91. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,637 (1993).
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McAninch,92 the Court stated that when a reviewing judge is in "grave
doubt" about an error's impact on the verdict, the judge slaould deem the
error not harmless and reverse the conviction.93 The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals had held that petitioner O'Neal failed to carry the burden of
establishing a substantial and injurious effect or influence of an
erroneous jury instruction.94 Vacating the decision,95 the U.S. Supreme
Court defined "grave doubt" as occurring when the judge feels "in
virtual equipoise" regarding the error's harmlessness. 96 More precisely,
when the likelihood that an error had a substantial and injurious effect or
influence on the verdict reaches a state of equilibrium with the
likelihood that it was harmless, the judge must rule in favor of the
petitioner.97 In petitioner O'Neal"s case, the district court's writ of
habeas corpus was proper if there was grave doubt about the
constitutionally deficient jury instruction.9"
Whatever its virtues in addressing the policy questions raised by
Brecht,99 O'Neal's harmless error legacy is that the possibility of an
error's impact upon a verdict must be far higher than Chapman's
"reasonable doubt" requirement, rising almost to the level of complete
ambivalence."° By requiring this degree of certainty, the Brecht-O'Neal
standard provides that habeas petitioners win only if they establish grave
doubt about the substantial and injurious effect a constitutional error had
on their convictions."°1 For a direct appeal from a district court
conviction, meanwhile, an appellate court must declare beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict
obtained."12
92. 115 S. Ct. 992(1995).
93. Id. at 994.
94. O'Neal v. Morris, 3 F.3d 143, 147 (6th Cir. 1993), vacated sub nom. C'Neal v. McAninch,
513 U.S. 432 (1995).
95. O'Neal, 115 S. Ct. at 999.
96. I at 994.
97. L Webster's defines equipoise as (1) a state of equilibrium, or (2) counterbalance.
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 421 (1984).
98. O'Neal, 115 S. Ct. at 994.
99. Id. at 998 (writing that grave doubt standard possessed "certain administrative virtues" such
as avoiding need for judges to read lengthy records to determine prejudice in every habeas case).
100. Id. at 994.
101. Id.;see Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,637-38 (1993).
102. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967).
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II. ANALYSIS OF HARMLESS ERROR REVIEW IN HABEAS
PROCEEDINGS
An examination of harmless error analysis requires a dual approach.
One approach is a macro-level discussion of the current harmless error
standard's effectiveness in federal courts. This macro-level approach
reveals defects in the Brecht-O'Neal standard that render it
fundamentally unfair to habeas petitioners. These defects result in
attempts to recharacterize errors to avoid applying harmless error
analysis. A second approach is a micro-level analysis of the way the
Brecht-O'Neal standard operated in a single case. A recent Ninth Circuit
decision illustrates the standard's defects and suggests the need for
reform.
A. Deficiencies in the Brecht Standardfor Harmless Error Review in
Habeas Proceedings
Brecht thwarts rational decisions regarding constitutional error in two
ways. First, it replaces Chapman's assessment of an error's impact on
the verdict with an inquiry as to whether the error meets the substantial
and injurious level. The degree of certainty prescribed by the U.S.
Supreme Court for this test fosters excessive appellate activism and
places a burden upon a collateral petitioner to establish what, if any,
harm the constitutional violation caused to the verdict. Second, Brecht
forces habeas petitioners and even some appellate courts to
recharacterize errors as "structurar' rather than "trial" error to avoid
altogether harmless error review.
1. Analytical Consequences of the Brecht-O'Neal Degree of Certainty
The Brecht-O'Neal standard disadvantages a habeas petitioner by
requiring a lesser degree of certainty before a federal court denies the
petition. By themselves, the Brecht and Chapman impact standards
differ only in semantics rather than substance." 3 The door remains open
for abuse by appellate courts, however, in view of the muddled degree of
certainty for determining whether the substantial and injurious effect or
influence standard has been met. Major implications follow from this
flaw. Its higher tolerance for error subverts factual reliability rather than
achieving it, even as it purports to further truth interests through a
103. See Edwards, supra note 82, at 1179.
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disguised return to an overwhelming evidence of guilt test. It fosters
excessive appellate activism by displacing the jury's role as arbiter of
facts. Finally, Brecht shifts a burden onto habeas petitioners to establish
an injurious effect of the constitutional error.
a. Subverting Factual Reliability to Finality Interests
The inadequate guidance provided to federal judges regarding an
appropriate degree of certainty subverts reliability interests to finality
interests. Chapman instructed courts to inquire whether an error could
have contributed to the verdict obtained; even if the impact were slight,
the reviewing court should overturn the conviction umless it could
declare the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."' One rationale
for Chapman is that it vindicated both the rights of the defendant and the
factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence. According to the
Court, it is the central purpose of criminal trials to resolve the latter.'0 5 If
a constitutional error impacts the verdict, even minimaally, then the
defendant's trial has been contaminated and the jury's factual
determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence is less reliable.
Although it promotes finality interests, the Brecht standard
undermines the factual reliability of error-infected convictions. In her
dissent in Brecht, Justice O'Connor wrote:
I am not persuaded that the Kotteakos standard offers an adequate
assurance of reliability.... By tolerating a greater probability that
an error with the potential to undermine verdict accuracy was
harmful, the Court increases the likelihood that a conviction will
be preserved despite an error that actually affected the reliability of
the trial.0 6
Thus, it is difficult to reconcile the Court's des.re for factual
reliability in applying the Chapman test with its tolerance of significant
errors under Brecht. The Ninth Circuit applied the grave doubt test in
Roy v. Gomez,"0 7 a habeas proceeding involving a petitioner convicted of
robbery and first-degree murder. The court of appeals held that an
erroneous jury instruction omitting an element of the crime was not
harmless because the reviewing court could not gauge the effect of the
104. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
105. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 308 (1991).
106. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 653 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
107. 81 F.3d 863 (9th Cir.), vacated sub nom. California v. Roy, 117 S. Ct. 337, 339 (1996) (per
curiam).
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error on the jury's verdict; therefore, a conscientious judge could only be
"in grave doubt as to the harmlessness of the error."'08 Viewing the
Ninth Circuit's decision as improperly modifying Brecht, the U.S.
Supreme Court vacated the decision and reiterated the higher degree of
doubt required by O'Neal for a reviewing court to overturn a
conviction.'0 9
Federal courts' willingness to overlook convictions contaminated by
error under Brecht-O'Neal suggests the continuation of an
overwhelming evidence of guilt test for harmless error. 0 Specifically, a
solid circumstantial case against a defendant renders all but the most
severe constitutional violations insubstantial and uninjurious."' The
notion that overwhelming evidence of guilt should override
constitutional errors has persisted nevertheless in U.S. Supreme Court
cases such as Rose v. Clark,"2 in which Chief Justice Burger's
concurring opinion provided a list of the evidence against the defendant
and stated that this evidence should have been sufficient for a finding of
guilt notwithstanding any error."3 Circuit courts also have continued to
employ the overwhelming-evidence test."4 As one U.S. Supreme Court
Justice has noted, this kind of analysis, which measures the harmlessness
of error according to the weight of the evidence that the prosecution
108. Id. at 868 (quoting O'Neal v. McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 992,995 (1995)).
109. Roy, 117 S. Ct. at 338-39.
110. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969) (framing harmless error test in
terms of whether "overwhelming" untainted evidence existed in record to support defendant's
conviction); see also Gregory Mitchell, Against "Overwhelming" Appellate Activism:
Constraining Harmless Error Review, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 1335, 1364 (1994) (noting that courts
utilizing Harrington test rarely reverse convictions).
I ll. By contrast, under Chapman, overwhelming evidence of guilt is theoretically irrelevant. In
Chapman, the Court suggested that harmless error analysis should not consist of an overwhelming
evidence test. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
112. 478 U.S. 570,584(1986).
113. Clark, 478 U.S. at 584 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
114. See, e.g., Price v. Shillinger, No. 95-8066, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 28866 (10th Cir. Nov. 4,
1996), at *9-'10 (holding that although "the [coerced] confession of a defendant is probably the
most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him, . . . the weight of the
prosecution's evidence supports a conclusion that [the testimony] did not have a 'substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict'); Pope v. Zenon, 69 F.3d 1018,
1025 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that admission of coerced confessions was harmless, in part, because
of "mountain of damning circumstantial evidence"); United States v. Disla, 805 F.2d 1340, 1347
(9th Cir. 1986) (holding error harmless despite some evidence of defendant's innocence because
"government presented overwhelming evidence"); Flittie v. Solem, 775 F.2d 933, 944 (8th Cir.
1985) ("It is unlikely that [the error] had a major impact on the jury .... The whole record shows
overwhelming independent evidence to support the conviction.").
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stacks against a defendant, erodes the individual rights and liberties that
elevate our system ofjustice.l15
b. Displacing the Jury as Arbiter of the Facts
Applying the Brecht-O'Neal standard, a reviewing court also usurps
the role of the jury in its inquiry into how substantial or injurious an
effect the error had on the verdict. One reason this usurpation is
improper is that appellate courts are not competent to conduct so
rigorous a factual inquiry. Even the Kotteakos court cautioned against
appellate intrusion upon the jury's domain.116 Review under Brecht
ignores the jury's better position to assess the evidence." 7 It continues
the trend of appellate judges placing themselves in jurors' shoes,"' to
hold constitutional errors harmless either if there is overwhelming
evidence of the defendant's guilt or if the jury otherwise reached the
"correct result.""' 9
Another reason the Brecht standard's invasion into the jury's province
is improper is that it violates the U.S. legal system's traditional roles for
juries and appellate judges. The importance of the jury can be traced to
the U.S. Constitution, where the Framers provided specifically for jury
trials in all criminal proceedings. 2 Jury trials comprise the heart of the
criminal justice system, in part, because a defendant expects to receive
judgment from a panel of peers and not from a panel of experienced
jurists who may have different conceptions of guilt and innocence."'
Particularly in cases involving coerced confessions or the erroneous
admission of other emotionally-charged evidence, where only complex
factual assessments may reveal the magnitude of the: error's effect,
115. Harrington, 395 U.S. at 256 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 763 (1946) ("[I]t is not the appellate court's
function to determine guilt or innocence .... Nor is it to speculate upon probable reconviction and
decide according to how the speculation comes out.").
117. See, e.g., Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794) ("It may not be amiss ... to
remind you of the good old rule, that on questions of fact, it is the province of the jury, on
questions of law, it is the province of the court, to decide.").
118. See, e.g., California v. Roy, 117 S. Ct. 337 (1996) (per curiam) (holding that erroneous jury
instruction that omitted crime's element was harmless unless reviewing court expressed grave
doubt about jury's verdict embracing missing element).
119. See Traynor, supra note 1, at 49-50; see also Bundy v. Florida, 479 U.S. 894, 897 (1986)
(Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 584 (1986)
(Burger, C.J., concurring); State v. Watkins, 547 P.2d 810, 822 (Kan. 1976).
120. "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury .... ." U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
121. See Mitchell, supra note 110, at 1354-55.
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appellate courts seize the opportunity to affirm a conviction simply
because the judges themselves think the verdict was correct based the
facts.' The U.S. Supreme Court has not clearly delineated discretionary
guidelines for appellate courts undertaking these factual assessments in
an expanded discretionary role."
C. Shifting the Burden onto Habeas Corpus Petitioners
The third major implication of the Brecht-O'Neal standard is that
habeas petitioners carry a burden to establish the harm caused by the
system's violation of their constitutional rights. From its inception, the
harmless error doctrine has placed a burden upon one party to establish
an error's harmlessness. The Chapman and Brecht-O'Neal standards
avoid explicit references to burdens of proof. In practice, however, the
U.S. Supreme Court and federal courts have placed a burden upon
prosecutors under the Chapman standard and upon habeas corpus
petitioners under the Brecht-O'Neal standard.
The Court's opinions imply that Chapman imposes a burden upon the
prosecution to come forward with proof that a constitutional error did
not contribute to the verdict obtained. The Court acknowledged in
Chapman that a constitutional error-admitting highly prejudicial
evidence or comments-imposed on someone other than the defendant a
burden to show the error's harmlessness.'24 On its face, the Chapman
test prescribes the "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden with which
criminal prosecutors are familiar.s Just as a jury must declare a
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to convict, a reviewing
court must declare an error's harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt to
uphold that conviction. 26 In Arizona v. Fulminante, determining an
122. See Mary Coombs, Constable Given Free Reign in Fulminante, Bostick, et al. as High
Court Blunders, N.J. L.J., Aug. 29, 1991, at 72.
123. Edwards noted that it is difficult for appellate judges to adhere to an analytical framework
when evidence of guilt is overwhelming. See Edwards, supra note 82, at 1191-92 ("In such
circumstances, it is by far the simpler and more natural course to construct a jurisprudence that
cares only for punishment of the guilty, and, accordingly, to discount all errors that fail to cast
doubt upon our own perceptions of culpability.").
124. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). Justice Black added: "It is for that reason
that the original common-law harmless error rule put the burden on the beneficiary of the error
either to prove that there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his erroneously obtained
judgment." Id
125. Id,
126. IR. (noting that although appellate judges ordinarily do not have task of applying
"reasonable doubt" test, its adoption would provide more workable standard for deciding whether
to affirm conviction).
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error's harmlessness hinged on whether the prosecution "met its burden
of demonstrating" that the admission of a coerced confession did not
contribute to the conviction.
27
The Court has changed positions regarding the potential burden
imposed upon a habeas petitioner under the Brecht-O'Neal harmless
error test. In Brecht, the Court held that petitioners are not entitled to
habeas relief unless "they can establish" that the constitutional trial error
had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the verdict. 28 In
O'Neal, the Court rejected the role of burden-shifting in habeas
proceedings. 9 Rather than managing an evidentiary burden, an
appellate judge must apply the Brecht harmlessness standard directly to
the available facts in the record. 130
Notwithstanding the Court's O'Neal directive, federal courts continue
to impose a burden upon petitioners to present affirmative evidence of
harm.' 3' At least two reasons explain the continued imposition of a
burden. First, a tension exists between the harmless error doctrine and
the traditional rule regarding a habeas petitioner who claims actual
innocence as the ground for the petition. Under the latter rule, a state
court judgment is set aside only when the prisoner meets a burden of
proving that his or her confinement violates a fundamental liberty
right. 32 Second, a conflict exists between O'Neal and the rule that a
127. 499 U.S. 279, 295-96 (1991) (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 26).
128. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos. v. United States, 328
U.S. 750 (1946)).
129. O'Neal v. McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 992,995 (1995).
130. Id. ("In such a case, we think it conceptually clearer for the judge to ask directly, 'Do I, the
judge, think that the error substantially influenced the jury's decision?' than for the judge to try to
put the same question in terms of proofburdens.").
131. See, e.g., Rice v. Wood, 77 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir.) ("Petitioner has proffered no
evidence... that any of the jurors displayed the least discomfort with th- process pursuant to
which the verdict was received."), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 191 (1996); Thonmpson v. Borg, 74 F.3d
1571, 1575 n.l (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 227 (1996) ("[U]nder Brecht 'petitioners now
face a greater burden' than they had [under Chapman] ... and 'must now show that the alleged
error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict."')
(quoting Jeffiies v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 1993)); Tapia ". Roe, No. C95-0607
MMC (OEW), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18316, at *8 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 1996) ('[P]etitioners
now face a greater burden under the Brecht standard ...."); Rodriguez v. Marshall, No. C94-1718-
LEW, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3150, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 1996) ("[T]he petitioner still bears
the heavy burden of proving that there was actual prejudice as a result of the trial error."); Grune v.
Thoubboron, 91 Civ. 3655 (SS), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3722, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1995)
("The habeas petitioner bears the burden of proving that trial errors have caused actual prejudice.").
132. See Simmons v. Blodgett, 910 F. Supp. 1519, 1526 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (quoting McKenzie
v. McCormick, 27 F.3d 1415 (9th Cir. 1994)), aff'd, No. 96-35095, 1997 WL 129023 (9th Cir.
Mar. 24, 1997).
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prisoner bears the burden of establishing that a constitutional error
occurred at all.133 The continuing presence of a burden upon petitioners
bears out fears that Brecht presents a most formidable obstacle to
obtaining habeas corpus relief based on constitutional claims. 1 4
2. Recharacterizing Errors To Avoid Applying the Brecht Standard.
In view of their burden to establish a substantial and injurious effect
to the degree of "equipoise," habeas petitioners have tried to avoid
undertaking harmless error analysis at all. As a starting point, the
threshold test of Arizona v. Fulminante becomes crucial. If a reviewing
court recognizes an error as a classic trial error, then it is subject to
harmless error analysis.135 If the error is a structural defect, then Brecht
does not apply and the court automatically reverses the conviction. 13 6
Petitioners and courts have struggled not only with the distinction
between these two characterizations, but also with fact patterns that fit
neither.
The most common attempted recharacterization is that an error is
structural rather than trial error.137 Whether an error rises to the level of a
defect in the trial mechanism results in a purely quantitative inquiry.
Neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the district or appellate courts,
however, specify the quantitative point at which an error ceases to be
"trial" and enters the realm of "structural," possibly because of an
inherent impossibility of performing such a task upon fact-dependent
inquiries. For example, the Court has deemed one erroneous jury
133. See, e.g., id. at 1527 (denying writ because petitioner failed to establish that constitutional
error had occurred).
134. See Bennett L. Gershman, The Gate Is Open But the Door Is Locked: Habeas Corpus and
Harmless Error, 51 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 115, 125 (1994).
135. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,307-08 (1991).
136. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629-30 (1993).
137. At least nine cases within the past two years involved a habeas petitioner's attempt to
recharacterize an error as structural. See Samuel v. Duncan, No. 95-56380, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS
18542, at *4-*5 (9th Cir. July 8, 1996) (denial of competency hearing); Rice v. Wood, 77 F.3d
1138, 1142 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (absence at death verdict), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 191 (1996),
Sherman v. Smith, 89 F.3d 1134, 1138 (4th Cir. 1996) (unauthorized juror visit to crime scene),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 765 (1997); Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1476 (9th Cir. 1995) (jury
instruction); Hegler v. Borg, 50 F.3d 1472, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995) (absence at reading of some trial
testimony); Tapia v. Roe, No. C95-0607 MMC (OEW), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18316, at *12
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 1996) (imprecise jury instruction and prosecutorial misconduct); Moore v.
Ponte, 924 F. Supp. 1281, 1295 (D. Mass. 1996) (defendant confined to "prisoner's dock" during
entire trial); Simmons, 910 F. Supp. at 1527 (jury's exposure to facts not in evidence); Cardinal v.
Gorczyk, 880 F. Supp. 261, 271 (D. Vt. 1995) (absence at voir dire), rev'd, 81 F.3d 18 (2d Cir.
1996).
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instruction to be structural and another a mere trial error although their
prejudicial impact is arguably indistinguishable.' Petitioners usually
are unsuccessful at recharacterizing errors as structural.3'
Recognizing the difficulty in recharacterizing an error as structural, a
habeas petitioner might recharacterize a constitutional error as falling
into a third category, known as a "Footnote Nine" error because of its
location in the Brecht opinion. Although such an error -was not present
in that case, the Brecht majority wrote that "a deliberate and especially
egregious error of the trial type, or one that is combined with a pattern of
prosecutorial misconduct, might so infect the integrity of the proceeding
as to warrant the grant of habeas relief."'4° Several federal courts have
recognized Footnote Nine errors as a distinct third category.'4 The Ninth
Circuit has twice identified Footnote Nine errors as a distinct category of
errors requiring automatic reversal, although the court has yet to reverse
a conviction on this ground. 42 Not all courts agree. The Second Circuit,
for example, recently sent a mixed message regarcing whether a
Footnote Nine error exists outside the realm of a classic trial error or
structural defect. 43
138. See California v. Roy, 117 S. Ct. 337, 339 (1996) (per curiam) (holding that omission of
element of crime from jury instructions is trial error subject to Brecht analysis); Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1993) (holding that deficient jury instruction on reasonable
doubt was structural error requiring automatic reversal).
139. See, e.g., Samuel, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 6589, at *4-*5 (holding that trial court's denial
of competency hearing was trial error); Plascencia, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 15634, at *5 (finding
that admission of coerced confession was trial error); Calderon, 52 F.3d at 1476 (holding that
instructional error was trial error unless it involved deficient reasonable-doubt instruction); Hegler,
50 F.3d at 1477 (holding that defendant's absence at reading of certain trial testimony was trial
error); Tapia, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18316, at *23-*24 (holding that imprecise jury instruction
was trial error); Moore, 924 F. Supp. at 1295 (holding that confining defendant to "prisoner's
dock" during entire proceedings was trial error); Simmons, 910 F. Supp. at 1527 (finding that jury's
exposure to facts not in evidence was trial error).
140. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638 n.9.
141. See e.g., Cupit v. Whitley, 28 F.3d 532, 538 (5th Cir. 1994) (recognizing Footnote Nine
errors as "'hybrid' or 'unusual' cases that do not fit so neatly" into one of two primary categories of
error); Hardnett v. Marshall, 25 F.3d 875, 879-81 (9th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that Footnote Nine
analysis required inquiry of whether integrity of proceeding was so infected that entire trial was
unfair); Simmons, 910 F. Supp. at 1527 (recognizing same).
142. See Lee v. Marshall, 42 F.3d 1296, 1298 (9th Cir. 1994) (commenting that officer's
unauthorized interference with jury deliberations not egregious enough to meet Footnote Nine
standard); Hardnett, 25 F.3d at 879-81 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that although prosecutor's
introduction of impermissible hearsay evidence violated defendant's Confrontation Clause rights,
error was not so egregious or deliberate as to meet Footnote Nine requirement).
143. See Peck v. United States, 73 F.3d 1220, 1229 (1995), vacated, No. 94-2444, 1997 WL
33947 (2d Cir. Jan. 30, 1997). On first hearing, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals applied
Footnote Nine analysis to an erroneous jury instruction, holding that although omitting an element
of a crime was a classic trial error, it infected the defendant's entire trial with "an error of
586
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The attempt to recharacterize errors as structural or Footnote Nine
errors departs from the principle that reviewing courts should undertake
a thorough analysis of the prior proceedings." Recharacterization
provides an opportunity for district and appellate courts more
sympathetic to a prisoner to overturn a conviction without undertaking a
rigorous analysis. Reviewing courts focus on categorizing the error
rather than evaluating its impact on a verdict. Recharacterization also
thwarts stare decisis principles regarding a particular error's amenability
to harmless error analysis. "' As an analysis of its most recent habeas
case demonstrates, the Ninth Circuit remains deeply divided over this
issue.'"
B. Rice v. Wood Illustrates the Brecht Test's Defects
1. Facts and Procedural History
David Lewis Rice was tried in King County Superior Court for the
Christmas Eve, 1985 murder of the Goldmark family.'47 The defendant
was present for the verdict, at which time the jury found him guilty of
four counts of aggravated first-degree murder.148 On the eve of his
sentencing hearing, Rice drank a homemade tobacco liquid that rendered
him unconscious. 4 9 He was hospitalized and was absent when the jury
returned his death sentence.' When neither prosecutors nor defense
counsel objected, the superior court judge proceeded with sentencing in
Rice's absence, and the jury sentenced Rice to death.'
constitutional dimensions" requiring reversal. Peck, 73 F.3d at 1229. Vacating upon rehearing, the
court of appeals not only held that the error was classic trial error subject to harmless error analysis,
but also omitted from its analysis any reference to Footnote Nine. Peck, 106 F.3d at 454.
144. See Traynor, supra note 1, at 30.
145. Four justices in Arizona v. Fulminante, dissenting from the idea that a coerced confession
can ever be subject to harmless error analysis, suggested that the majority created its trial-structural
dichotomy as a convenient way of overruling a "vast body of precedent" without a word. Arizona
v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,289 (1991).
146. See Rice v. Wood, 77 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 191 (1996). In
a six-five decision, the court of appeals vacated its three-judge panel's decision characterizing as
"structural" the constitutional error of receiving a death verdict in the defendant's involuntary
absence. Id at 1145.
147. See State v. Rice, 110 Wash. 2d 577,580,757 P.2d 889, 891-92 (1988).
148. Id
149. Id. at 614, 757 P.2d at 909.
150. Id. at 614-15, 757 P.2d at 909.
151. Id
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On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed his
conviction on the ground that Rice's actions constituted a suicide
attempt that effectively waived his right of presence at sentencing.'52
The court reasoned that because this error was a rule violation rather
than a constitutional infringement,'53 the trial judge was justified in
proceeding in absentia because administrative concens such as a
sequestered jury overrode the slight possibility that :Rice's absence
affected the jury. 54 Following an unsuccessful personal restraint petition
on other grounds,' 5 Rice sought a writ of habeas corpus in the Federal
District Court for the Western District of Washington.'56
Confronting the district court was the issue whether the trial court
violated Rice's right to be present during rendition of the death verdict.
In Diaz v. United States, 57 the U.S. Supreme Court held that when
persons are tried for crimes, even the most heinous of crimes, the Sixth
Amendment guarantees them the right to be present in the courtroom at
every stage of their trials.'58 Although this rule applies to all accused
persons, defendants can waive the right of presence either expressly or
manifestly through their conduct. 5 9 Because neither the trial judge nor
the Washington Supreme Court conducted a hearing to determine
whether Rice voluntarily waived his right of presence, 60 the district
court held that receiving the death verdict in Rice's absence violated his
Sixth Amendment right.16' The State of Washington appealed the district
court's grant of habeas corpus. 62 After a three-judge panel of the Ninth
Circuit upheld the writ, 63 the Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banc and
152. Id. at 619-20, 757 P.2d at 912.
153. L at 616, 757 P.2d at 910; see also Wash. R. Crim. P. 3.4.
154. Id. at 615-16, 757 P.2d at 910.
155. See In re Rice, 118 Wash. 2d 876, 897, 828 P.2d 1086, 1098 (1992).
156. See Rice v. Wood, 77 F.3d 1138, 1139 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 191
(1996).
157. 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
158. Id. at 445. The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... U.S. Const. amend. VI.
159. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 346-47 (1970) ("[I]f our courts are to remain what the
Founders intended, the citadels of justice, their proceedings cannot and must not be infected with
the sort of scurrilous, abusive language and conduct paraded before the Illinois trial judge in this
case.").
160. See Rice v. Wood, 44 F.3d 1396, 1400 (1995), vacated in part, 77 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 191 (1996).
161. Rice, 77 F.3d at 1140.
162. Rice, 44 F.3d at 1399.
163. Id. at 1402.
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reinstated Rice's death sentence, holding that it was harmless error to
proceed with the death verdict in the defendant's absence.' 6 On October
7, 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.1 65
2. The Ninth Circuit's Struggle To Apply the Brecht Test
Rice v. Wood demonstrates the difficulties appellate courts have in
applying harmless error analysis under Brecht-O'Neal. More precisely,
this case shows how a habeas petitioner, and even an appellate court,
recharacterizes an error as structural to avoid applying the Brecht-
O'Neal standard. The Ninth Circuit's three-judge panel made two
findings in agreeing with Rice's characterization of the error as
structural under Fulminante. First, Rice's absence occurred during the
critical stage of sentencing rather than during presentation of the State's
case.'66 Second, the error could not be quantitatively assessed in the
context of other evidence. 67 Specifically, the three-judge panel found it
impossible to calculate how Rice's absence may have affected the
sentencing. 61
Rehearing the case en banc, the Ninth Circuit applied the Brecht
standard without any reference to O'Neal's "grave doubt" degree of
certainty, or any degree of certainty for that matter. 69 Had the en banc
panel applied Chapman, it would have required them to declare their
belief beyond a reasonable doubt that the error of receiving the death
verdict in Rice's absence did not contribute to his conviction. The en
banc majority opinion, however, contains references only to the
unlikelihood that Rice's presence would have affected the jurors, the
strength of the aggravating circumstances, and the weakness of the
mitigating circumstances. 7
The absence of a degree of certainty led to an overwhelming evidence
of guilt approach by the Rice majority. The majority spoke of "senseless
butchery of the worst sort," and noted that Rice's presence in the
courtroom for the return of the guilt verdict did not dissuade any jurors
from convicting him.' It also claimed that during voir dire the
164. SeeRice, 77 F.3d at 1145.
165. See Rice, 117 S. Ct. 191.
166. See Rice, 44 F.3d at 1401-02.
167. Id. at 1402 n.9.
168. Id. at 1404.
169. See Rice, 77 F.3d at 1145.
170. Id at 1144-45.
171. Id at 1144.
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prosecution had filtered out any prospective jurors who would have been
uncomfortable looking Rice in the eye and sentencing him to die.' 72
Even if the en banc panel applied the O'Neal "grave doubt" standard
without actually mentioning it, Rice provides a strong arguiment that the
Brecht-O'Neal standard unfairly handicaps habeas petitioners in their
quests for new trials. For it is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine the
judges arriving at a state of "equipoise" regarding the error's effect, in
view of the court's overwhelming-evidence approach.'7T
The court of appeals found overwhelming evidence of juror antipathy
toward Rice; therefore, he carried the insurmountable burden of proving
that the constitutional error had a substantial and injurious effect or
influence on his death sentence. The majority noted that the petitioner
"proffered no evidence" that jurors were uncomfortable rendering the
death verdict in his absence. 74 An equally plausible inference from this
lack of discomfort is that the jury found it easier to deliver the death
sentence without facing Rice, which in itself constitutes an impact on the
jury's decision to impose death. The Ninth Circuit did not indicate what
amount of evidence of potential juror change would have sufficed to
overcome the overwhelming evidence ofjuror antipathy toward Rice.
III. PROPOSAL
Recognizing the need for flexibility in assessing diverse types of
errors, it would be inappropriate to mandate a blanket rule for automatic
affirmance or reversal.7" Federal courts, states, and prisoners all would
benefit, however, from a harmless error test that recuires from the
reviewing court a consistent and clearly defined degree of certainty. In
addition, the tendency to recharacterize trial errors as structural supports
abandoning that dichotomy in favor of an individualized threshold
evaluation aided only by stare decisis. If this threshold is met, federal
courts should consider a harmless error inquiry that blends the
constrained spirit of Chapman with the finality interests espoused by
Brecht.
172. Ma The five dissenting justices pointed out that prosecutorial attention to the jury's views
on capital punishment only furthers the notion that a defendant's presence has a significant impact
on death sentencing. Id. at 1149 (Nelson, C.J., dissenting).
173. Although evidence of Rice's guilt was not at issue because the error occurred at sentencing,
the appellate court based its finding of harmlessness upon overwhelming evidence of aggravating
factors supporting the death sentence. See id. at 1144. But see Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180,
1190 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting overwhelming-evidence-of-guilt test for harmlass error).
174. See Rice, 77 F.3d at 1145.
175. See Traynor, supra note 1, at 50.
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A. New Harmless Error Test for Collateral Review
To affirm a conviction, a State should establish by clear and
convincing proof that the error did not have a substantial and injurious
effect on the verdict. This new test moderates the extreme, and
sometimes ignored, 76 degree of certainty currently in force in federal
courts. The harmlessness standard would remain the Brecht substantial-
and-injurious test. The degree of certainty, however, would differ from
Brecht and its progeny. Before affirming a conviction notwithstanding a
constitutional error, a federal judge must declare that it is highly
probable that the error did not have a substantial and injurious effect or
influence on the verdict. Thus, the highly probable test prescribes a
degree of certainty more restrictive than O'Neal but less restrictive than
Chapman.
The advantages of this test are palpable. It provides a clear, realistic
degree of certainty regarding harmless error. It places the burden of
establishing harmlessness on the state. The new test promotes finality
concerns better than Chapman, which seems to be important to the
federal courts in handling habeas corpus proceedings as contrasted with
direct appeals. Finally, it restores individual constitutional rights as a
priority in harmless error review, although not so far as to threaten the
federalism principles inherent within states' concerns over finality of
convictions.
A highly probable test provides a specific and fair degree of certainty
in determining harmlessness. Whereas the "equipoise" test allows
affirmance only when a judge's doubts as to harmlessness rise to the
level of a vague ambivalence, the highly probable test uses a standard of
proof with which most courts are familiar. This familiarity might
prevent courts from misapplying or refusing to apply a degree of
certainty. Had the Rice court applied the highly probable test, the
prisoner would have received a review based on consistent, clear
standards, rather than a review that was arguably a path of least
resistance for the Ninth Circuit. The proposed test avoids the evils of
inadequate analysis by conditioning affirmance on high probability that
error did not affect the judgment.'"
This test removes the burden from petitioner and restores it to the
state, in keeping with the U.S. Supreme Court's emphasis that a
constitutional error imposes on someone other than the defendant a
176. See, e.g., Rice, 77 F.3d at 1145 (holding error harmless to unknown degree of certainty).
177. See Traynor, supra note 1, at 50.
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burden to show the error's impact.' As Justice O'Connor opined in
Brecht, "[P]risoners who may have been convicted mistakenly because
of constitutional trial error have suffered a grievous wrong and ought not
to be required to bear the greater risk of uncertainty . . . .""' At first
glance, shifting the burden in Rice v. Wood might seem trivial. However,
given the unclear degree of certainty, the Ninth Circuit's six-to-five vote
suggests it would have been more difficult for the State to establish by
clear and convincing proof that the error did not affect the verdict. The
proposed test returns to the vision for collateral review stated in
Kotteakos, where the U.S. Supreme Court insisted a state must carry the
burden of sustaining a verdict where an alleged error affects substantial
rights.
180
Although not as friendly to finality interests as the Brecht-O'Neal
test, the highly probable test provides adequate deference to state courts
without sacrificing an individual's constitutional rights. By requiring a
lesser degree of certainty than Chapman's reasonable doubt test, the
proposed framework ensures that federal courts will not displace state
courts in keeping prisoners behind bars where appropriat:e. Presumably
state courts will continue to apply the Chapman harmless error test for
direct appeals whenever a prisoner alleges federal constitutional error.
Along with its concern for finality, the new test reflects the -remedial and
deterrence purposes of reversal, which, notwithstanding evidence of
guilt, uphold constitutional rights not only for their truth-furthering
value but also their protection of civil liberties and contribution to the
judicial system's integrity.'
B. Abandon the Fulminante Test in Favor of a Threshold Test Based
on Stare Decisis
Because petitioners may be tempted to continue recharacterization of
errors as "structural" to invoke an automatic reversal, the Fulminante
test should be abandoned as a means of bringing a consistently rational
approach to evaluating constitutional error. Justice Traynor once pointed
out that "[t]he real problem of justice is not whether an error is of
constitutional or nonconstitutional dimension or whetaer it mars a
178. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
179. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 654 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
180. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 760 (1946).
181. See Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 Colum. L.
Rev. 79, 90 (1988).
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criminal or a civil trial, but whether it affected the judgment., 18 2
Harmless error determination, whether on direct or collateral review,
should not hinge upon the characterization of an error as trial or
structural. Recharacterization provides appellate judges with the
opportunity for all too ready reversal.
Courts should rely on stare decisis in deciding whether to apply
harmless error analysis. Although far from perfect, stare decisis is
preferable to the Fulminante test for two reasons. First, the U.S.
Supreme Court's list of errors requiring automatic reversal is too short to
warrant a detached threshold test. 3 Second, the Court has failed to
justify its replacement of ordinary stare decisis principles with the
Fulminante test.184 If stare decisis does not require reversal of an error,
the highly probable standard for harmless error analysis ensures that
courts will undertake a thorough determination of an error's impact.
Prisoners deserve this rigorous inquiry when reversal and affirmance are
matters of life and death.
IV. CONCLUSION
Consider the proposed test in the context of the hypothetical
introduced at the beginning of this Comment. Under the Brecht-O'Neal
test, prisoner B must establish to the level of "equipoise" that the error
had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the murder
conviction. Under the proposed test, the State must establish that it was
highly probable the coerced confession did not have such an impact.
This higher and clearer degree of certainty, although below the degree
required for direct appeals, might result in a new trial and perhaps life
instead of death for prisoner B. Even if it upholds the conviction, the
reviewing court that applies the highly probable test vindicates prisoner
B's rights without threatening the state's interest in finalizing a correctly
obtained conviction. The soul of fairness may yet conceive the soul of
reason.
182. Traynor, supra note 1, at 48-49.
183. To date, the following errors require reversal: depriving a defendant of counsel; trying a
defendant before a biased judge; unlawfully excluding members of a defendant's race from a grand
jury; denying the right to self-representation; and denying the right to a public trial. See Vasquez v.
Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986) (grand jury); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) (public
trial); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) (self-representation); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (denial of counsel); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (biased
judge).
184. See supra note 145.

